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WHAT DOES DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKING HAVE TO DO
WITH PRACTICING LAW?
PEGGY COOPER DAVIS*
The University of Maryland's 2008 Symposium on Documen-
tary Film and the Law' featured a screening and discussion of Omar
and Pete, Tod Lending's compelling 2005 documentary of two men's
efforts to return to their communities after serving substantial prison
terms. 2 In this essay, I compare narrative and cognitive strategies at
work in Omar and Pete and those a lawyer might use in representing a
person like Omar or Pete in a sentencing proceeding.
When the film's viewers met Omar and Pete, both were middle
aged men with nearly life-long histories of drug abuse, crime, 3 and in-
carceration. By the end of the film, viewers saw that their respective
lives have taken very different turns. Omar was released from prison
and placed in a series of drug rehabilitation programs. Each program
seemed well designed and staffed, and Omar seemed determined to
succeed in each. But Omar repeatedly returned to drugs and crime; and
by the end of the film he had been sentenced to another lengthy prison
term. Pete, on the other hand, made a successful career for himself,
married happily, and remained drug and crime free.
As I watched the film for the first time, I suspected that it had
started out as a film about Omar, and that the filmmaker decided to
give Pete equal billing when Omar's rehabilitation efforts failed. I
thought this because the film followed Omar much more closely than
it followed Pete, particularly in the first years during which it was shot.
I noticed that Pete's earlier release was not chronicled, that he was
doing well at the time of Omar's release, and that he spoke to Omar
more as a mentor or counselor than as a peer. All of this led me to sus-
pect that early footage of Pete was shot because of the counseling role
he played with respect to Omar and that a later decision had been
made to create out of the footage a story of the two men's efforts at re-
habilitation.
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1. What Documentary Films Teach Us about the Criminal Justice System: Dialogues
Among Filmmakers, Formerly Incarcerated Persons, Service Providers, Law Teachers, and
Law Students, University of Maryland School of Law, Feb. 29 to Mar. 1, 2008.
2. OMAR & PETE (PBS 2005).
3. By their own accounts, neither man had spent a year out of prison in his adult life.
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My suspicions related to my guesses about the filmmaker's
goals. I assumed that Lending wanted to tell a sympathetic and hopeful
story about rehabilitation from drug abuse and crime, support the un-
usually intensive Maryland rehabilitative programs in which Omar and
Pete participated, and perhaps also take a. stand aainst the unusually
high levels of incarceration in the United States. These motivations
were confirmed in some measure by Lending's remarks at the Sympo-
sium, but I was subsequently told that the film's closer attention to
Omar was a result of Pete's greater sense of privacy rather than evi-
dence of a deliberate restructuring.
Whether or not the filmmaker deliberately restructured Omar
and Pete in the service of a message, it is interesting to consider the
film's structure in light of its apparent message. This exercise is espe-
cially valuable for criminal defense lawyers, who must regularly at-
tempt to persuade judges to afford rehabilitative opportunities to their
clients. A fundamental question for these lawyers will always be: How
can I diminish the glaring salience of recidivism risk and focus deci-
sion-makers on the possibilities that Pete's story represents? How can
I persuade a judge that the possibility that my client will succeed, as
Pete did, is at least as important as the risk that he will fail, as Omar
did?
I begin by recognizing that conscious efforts to persuade an
audience are necessary to competent criminal defense work, but may
be somewhat controversial in documentary filmmaking. A criminal de-
fense lawyer is obligated to work diligently-within the bounds of
professional ethics-to safeguard a client's liberty. A documentary
filmmaker, on the other hand, has a less fixed mission, flowing from a
complex mix of ethical, artistic, social and personal commitments. The
documentary filmmaker is not obliged or encouraged-as every law-
yer is, by a governing code of professional responsibility 5-to be a
client's diligent advocate. Despite these differences between documen-
tary filmmaking and lawyering, it is useful to consider what lessons a
film like Omar and Pete might hold for practicing lawyers or lawyer-
ing theorists.
6
4. "[A] higher proportion of the adult population in the United States is behind bars
than anywhere else in the world." MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE
POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1 (2006).
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007).
6. Lawyering theory is the multidisciplinary study of law in use. For a rich introduc-
tion, see ANTHONY AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000). For a succinct
introduction, see Peggy Cooper Davis, Law and Lawyering: The Interactive Study of Law in
Use, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 185 (1992).
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Scholars of the arts and human sciences have given systematic
thought to methods of persuasion and have developed concepts that
can be useful in legal practice 7 as well as in everyday negotiations with
friends, colleagues, and strangers. 8 Because lawyers are obligated to
advocate as effectively as possible within the bounds of propriety,
some legal scholars have begun to borrow from these fields in an effort
to systematize how we learn and think about persuasion. 9 The structure
of Omar and Pete can be analyzed using three concepts that lawyering
theorists have borrowed from the arts and sciences: loss aversion, at-
tribution bias, and narrative form.
I. Loss AVERSION
Human beings choosing among alternative courses of action
will usually avoid choices that appear to carry a greater risk of loss.'
0
Indeed, this is so even when the appearance of risk of loss is illusory. "1
I would not be willing to pay for a plastic mug, but if you give me a
plastic mug, I am likely to want to hold onto it even if you offer to buy
it for a small sum. Similarly, a person making a long term investment
may have access to data showing that over time it is more profitable to
ride out the ups-and-downs of the stock market than to switch in down
times to an investment with less risk of short term losses. It hurts to
lose things. Behavioral scientists will tell us that it hurts even more to
lose things conspicuously. We are better able to wait out a bad stock
market if we do not pay too much attention to our monthly statements
and do not follow the market's ups-and-downs.
In a criminal justice context, decision-makers are likely to see
recidivism and the harms it would cause as looming and urgent risks of
loss. The defendant may be a danger to others, and he stands, safely
controlled, before a tribunal. There is a natural hesitation about losing
that control and taking the risk that the defendant will commit another
crime. Other risks-like the loss of human potential or a child's loss of
7. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 7.
8. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 2d ed. 1991) (1983); Gerald P. Lopez,
Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984).
9. The best account of these efforts is contained in Ty Alper, Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Todd E. Edelman, Randy Hertz, Rachel Shapiro Janger, Jennifer McAllister-Nevins, Sonya
Rudenstine & Robin Walker-Sterling, Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of
the First Rodeny King Assault Trial, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 1-20 (2005).
10. See Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk:
Bias Sequentiality and the Law, 2 U Cm. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 139, 148 (1995).
11. Id. at 149.
10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
an imprisoned parent's support and guidance-tend to be less salient.
Moreover, the failure to guard against other risks is unlikely to be re-
ported to or blamed on the decision-maker: a judge who imposes a
long-term prison sentence on a man or woman on the brink of rehabili-
tation will not suffer accusatory tabloid headlines; a judge who sen-
tences a person who later commits a serious crime may well make the
front pages. Decision-makers can therefore be expected to shy away
from dispositions that would release a criminal defendant from custo-
dy. And it is likely that defense lawyers will emphasize, while prose-
cutors will downplay, the hidden losses that unwarranted or excessive
incarceration carries-for the defendant, the defendant's family, the
criminal justice system, and for society as a whole. 12
It makes perfect sense, then, that a filmmaker sympathetic to
criminal defendants would want to pair the story of Omar, the recidiv-
ist, with the story of Pete, the compassionate rehabilitation counselor
and settled family man. A wise defense lawyer will adopt a similar
strategy. S/he will take pains to make the perhaps more frequent losses
associated with punitive sentencing as vivid as the apparent and fear-
some risk of recidivism.
II. ATTRIBUTION BIAS
Human beings considering another's conduct or culpability are
more likely to attribute negative outcomes to individual character than
to circumstances.1 3 The benefits of simplicity and efficiency draw us
to imagine that our problems have single causes and simple solutions.
Failures of empathy and patience lead us to imagine that bad outcomes
are the fault of bad characters (who can be isolated or eliminated) ra-
ther than the result of a variety of circumstances (that can not be easily
identified and controlled).
I noticed this tendency in myself as I watched Omar and Pete.
On the occasion of an arrest for violating the probation condition that
he remain drug-free, Omar slips out of the thoughtful and self-effacing
soliloquies that characterized his earlier appearances in the film. He is
suddenly full of denial and hostility. He claims innocence in the face
of clear evidence of his drug use; he blames probation officials for be-
traying him. Ah, ha! I thought, He's jive. He's no good after all. I
quickly lost sight of Omar's economic, social and personal circums-
12. See id. at 150-52 (discussing the analogous stances of lawyers representing child
protective agencies and lawyers representing parents accused of abuse or neglect).
13. NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS
56-62 (Am. Psychol. Ass'n 2001).
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tances, and focused on his character. There it is, I thought. He's bad. I
turned from the man's potential and his struggles, and began to focus
on the risk of his recidivism. He needs to be put away.
Why did the filmmaker choose to show this moment? Was it so
striking that he could not in good conscience conceal it from his au-
diences? Were there other unattractive Omar moments that he chose
not to show? Did the filmmaker struggle over the decision to show this
one?
Were there similarly unattractive Pete moments? None was
shown, and I think this fact contributed to my sense that Omar failed
because he was Omar-and that Omar is, after all, just a bad person.
A defense lawyer cannot conceal all of a client's faults and
weaknesses. It is therefore incumbent upon the defense lawyer to
create a story of the client in which bad moments are not seen as win-
dows on an intrinsically evil character, but as downs in the ups-and-
downs of a worthy life. This is inordinately difficult-not only be-
cause of our tendency to attribute others' bad acts to their characters-
but also because we are trapped in narrative patterns that lend them-
selves so readily to melodrama.
III. NARRATIVE AND MELODRAMATIC FORM
In a book that all students of the law should read-LEGAL
BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS-Neal
Feigenson examines how the attribution biases discussed above com-
bine with other cognitive biases to yield, at least in our culture, a hu-
man tendency to understand accounts of possibly blameworthy events
as melodrama. 14 Feigenson begins with the widespread (but not entire-
ly uncontroversial) theory that we are prone to understand events in a
standard, four part narrative form: (1) a positive, steady state of affairs;
(2) a trouble that disturbs the steady state; (3) efforts to redress the
trouble; and (4) restoration of the steady state, (or, more rarely, accep-
tance of a new steady state). 15 Because, as I have said, the story of the
crime is the most obviously salient story in a criminal trial, the crime
and its consequences are likely to be taken as the "trouble" in a plot
that proceeds through efforts to redress the crime and restore the peace
that it disturbed and ends with the punishment of a villain.
The standard narrative form itself operates to the defendant's
disadvantage in a story of crime. This is because it chops reality into
14. Id. at 151-69.
15. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 7 at 110-14.
12 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
short-story-sized units and features a trouble that can be identified and
resolved. The defendant, of course, is the obvious candidate to be the
source of trouble. It follows that the defendant's conviction and isola-
tion satisfy the narrative progression by restoring a state of peace. This
point is more easily understood if an alternative form is considered: If
we were inclined to view the world in epic rather than standard narra-
tive terms, our focus might be drawn to forces other than-and larger
than-the defendant. We might then see the crime as having complex
and multiple causes. And we might imagine the defendant over the
larger arc of a lifetime rather than within the context of a single and
blameworthy action.
A melodrama takes the standard narrative form, but it has addi-
tional features that compound the anti-defendant/pro-prosecution bi-
ases associated with the form itself. Following our tendencies to blame
trouble on single, character-driven causes, the melodrama features
trouble that is caused by the deeply villainous character of the troub-
lemaker rather than by the circumstances in which the agent and the
victim of trouble have found themselves. Following our need for sim-
plification and our wish for closure, the melodrama ends when a vir-
tuous hero defeats or destroys the villain in an act that restores a
peaceful steady state. It is a simple story with very good characters and
very bad characters, and it ends happily because good characters pre-
vail. It is also a story of restoration rather than a story of transforma-
tion. The steady state-so easily read as the maintenance of proper and
lawful norms-is restored; the audience is not led to question settled
norms or to imagine adjustment to a different way of thinking or get-
ting on in the world.
Decision-makers' tendency to analyze events in melodramatic
terms is, then-like their tendencies toward loss aversion, attribution
biases and standard narrative focus-excellent news for prosecutors
and bad news for defense lawyers. Decision-makers will be easily
lured to blame crimes on and villainize criminal defendants. Defense
lawyers will have the difficult task of focusing judges and juries on
plots other than the story of the crime and its punishment and/or com-
bating the appeal of melodrama. Changing the plot is sometimes poss-
ible; Anthony Amsterdam and Randy Hertz brilliantly demonstrated
this in their analysis of how a defense lawyer's closing argument trans-
formed a homicide case from a story of the murder, into a story of the
juror's struggle to try the defendant fairly. 16 But, particularly at the
punishment phase of a criminal trial, the defense will also need to con-
16. Anthony Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of the Closing Arguments in a
Jury Trial, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55 (1992).
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front and complicate melodrama's simple story of the crime, melo-
drama's villainous characterization of the accused or convicted crimi-
nal, and the decision-makers' urge to play the hero by convicting the
villain and having him locked away or killed.
Omar and Pete gives us ideas about how the defense can break
out of the melodramatic form. It is not a crime story, but a story about
rehabilitative programs and efforts. The steady state is life as a free cit-
izen. The troubles are drug abuse and related crimes. Former prison
inmates are the heroes; their helpers and co-stars are those who design
and support rehabilitative programs and those who work in them. The
focus is not on a single criminal act, but on years of effort to shake
drugs and earn a living lawfully. Indeed, the audience learns very little
about the individual crimes committed by Omar or Pete, but is focused
on agendas for recovery and reform.
Unfortunately, this plot shift does not guarantee that the film's
audience will be sympathetic to the rehabilitative model. Omar fails.
The addition-if it was such--of Pete's success leaves the apparent
odds of success at only fifty-fifty. The pains taken to give Omar a re-
habilitative chance seem extreme, and the efforts to help him seem
costly. Loss aversion rears its head again as the audience is forced to
confront ugly realities of rehabilitative failure and recidivism.
If the film gave us a basis for distinguishing the situations or
characters of Pete and Omar, defense lawyers might seize on that dif-
ference and attempt to align their clients with Pete and distinguish
them from Omar. Unfortunately, Pete's success remains something of
a mystery, while Omar's failure is chalked up to unexplained aspects
of his character: Omar is just Omar. This character-based thesis sends
us back to the world-view of a melodrama: There are bad apples. Good
people should learn to identify them and toss them out before they
spoil the peck.
IV. BEYOND Loss AVERSION, ATTRIBUTION BIAS, AND MELODRAMA
We have come to an uneasy peace with the notion that it is bet-
ter to allow a guilty person go free than to convict and punish a inno-
cent person. The idea that an innocent would be executed or confined
to a prisoner's existence is sufficiently intolerable that we are will-
ing-albeit not always happy-to protect against false positives when
conviction is at issue. That is why we require proof beyond reasonable
doubt to convict a person of a crime.
But false positives seem more tolerable when disposition is at
issue. Why is that? How can we construct stories that will sensitize de-
14 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
cision-makers to the tragedy of human lives unnecessarily spent in
steel cages? The creators of Omar and Pete were right to offset the an-
xiety aroused by Omar's story by directing their audience's attention
to Pete. Moreover, it is fair enough that the filmmakers did not ad-
dress recidivism's odds or instruct their audience in how to distinguish
the Omars and Petes of the world. Recidivism's odds are subject to a
morass of unknown variables, and however they are stated, they entail
a residue of risk that may well seem too great to a decision-maker who
may bear public responsibility for harms a released defendant might do
to others. Further, the human and social sciences have not taught us to
predict dangerousness or criminality with sufficient precision to justify
a sacrifice of life or liberty.
What more can we do as advocates? We might address the
problem of false positives by educating decision-makers to the fact
that cognitive biases will cause the odds of rehabilitative failure to
loom with disproportionate effect.' 7 This may help, but I do not think
it will be sufficient. Just sentencing requires more than a realistic as-
sessment of risk. In my view, it requires an empathetic appreciation of
each defendant's human dignity and value. It was a commitment to re-
spect for human dignity that enabled the Constitutional Court of South
Africa to outlaw capital punishment while the Supreme Court of the
United States continues to find it constitutionally tolerable.' 8 This
kind of commitment grows, I think, from an empathetic appreciation
of each defendant's humanity and potential, regardless of factors like
class or race or personal history that might seem to set a defendant
apart. Defense lawyers must struggle against the pulls of loss aversion,
attribution bias and melodramatic form to encourage decision-makers
to recognize a clients' human dignity and become allies in clients'
struggles to realize their human potential.
I have often relied in my teaching on techniques developed by
Augusto Boal, the Brazilian artist/politician who uses theater to en-
courage political agency and awareness among oppressed people.' 9 At
the heart of Boal's method is a strategy for disrupting the standard
narrative and melodramatic forms.2 0 Instead of creating plays that
preach to his audiences by telling them settled stories, Boal works with
17. See Davis & Barua, supra note 11, at 148.
18. Compare State v. Makwanye 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.), with Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 429 U.S. 1301 (1976).
19. For descriptions of Boal's work, see PLAYING BOAL: THEATRE, THERAPY, ACTIVISM
(Mady Schutzman & Jan Cohen-Cruz eds., Routledge 1995) [hereinafter PLAYING BOAL];
AGUSTO BOAL, THEATER OF THE OPPRESSED (Theatre Communications Group 1993) (1979).
20. See generally PLAYING BOAL, supra note 19; Boal, supra note 19.
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his audiences to construct scenarios that pose problems and the possi-
bility of trouble. These scenarios are first acted out with a predictably
unfortunate ending. But this is only the beginning of the drama. The
scenario is repeated, perhaps many times, with audience members in-
vited to step in for one of the characters in an effort to change the out-
come. 2 Instead of a steady state, trouble, and restoration story, Boal
helps people to create stories of struggle. He empowers his audiences
to feel that by their actions they can prevent bad outcomes instead of
settling for punishing them.
Reflecting on Boal's methods has helped me to pinpoint a dis-
comfort with Omar and Pete: because the film seemed to document
contrasting stories of failure and success rather than an ongoing story
of struggle, I never felt fully engaged with Pete's rehabilitative
progress. As a result, I was unable to imagine a role for myself as
Pete's ally or helper. By contrast, I was drawn-in part because of
cognitive biases and in part because of a loss of empathy-to speculate
that Omar, who had the benefit of a number of allies and helpers over
the course of the film, was a bad apple who would inevitably have to
be isolated.
The documentary filmmaker has an obligation to tell the story
s/he is documenting; this may well override the filmmaker's ability to
tell the story that would be most persuasive in behalf of its central cha-
racters. The story of Omar and Pete as ex-offenders put me in the posi-
tion of comparing and judging their success or failure. It was engross-
ing drama, but its message was, appropriately, ambiguous.
How might defense lawyers, with a clear duty of persuasion,
speak differently about Omar and Pete? We would want to resist me-
lodramas' pull to see people as very, very good or very, very bad. We
would want to resist the natural pull to attribute negative conduct to an
inherently evil character rather than to complex and multiple circums-
tances that might be collectively controlled. And we would want to en-
courage our audience to worry as much about loss of opportunity and
potential as about loss of security. All of this would be exceedingly
difficult, and I have no confidence that we would succeed. But here are
some things we might try: We might tell the story of Pete the counse-
lor rather than the story of Omar and Pete. We might encourage a deci-
sion-maker to identify, not with Pete's self-rehabilitative efforts, but
with his efforts to save others. We might offer Pete as a model of faith
in each ex-offender's human dignity and potential. With all of this, we
21. This process, known as "forum theater," is described in Augusto Boal, She Made
Her Brother Smile: A Three-Minute Forum Theater Experience, in PLAYING BOAL, supra note
16 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 8:7
would hope to draw the decision-maker into being an agent in the
struggle to make rehabilitation successful, rather than a critical observ-
er of rehabilitative efforts that succeed or fail.
